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I. INTRODUCTION

A significant percentage of scholarly economics articles, and a far
higher percentage of scholarly Law & Economics articles, focus on the
economic or allocative efficiency1 of the non-government or government
choices they investigate—i.e., on the difference between the equivalentdollar gains a relevant choice confers on its beneficiaries and the

* John B. Connally Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A. (Cornell Univ.); Ph. D.
(Economics) (London School of Economics); L.L.B. (Yale Law School); M. Phil. (Oxford Univ.).
1. I sometimes substitute the expression “allocative efficiency” for “economic efficiency” to
remind readers that the concept is a technical term—in particular, to combat the mistaken tendency
of economists and their readers to assume that increases in economic efficiency are morally
valuable in themselves and, indeed, that choices that increase economic efficiency are always
morally desirable.
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equivalent-dollar losses it imposes on its victims. 2 Economists have
never tried to assess any choice’s impact on economic efficiency by
identifying all or a random sample of the choice’s winners and losers
and estimating these parties’ respective equivalent-dollar gains and
losses. In part, this fact reflects the incentives that the
beneficiaries/victims of any choice have respectively to exaggerate the
magnitude of the equivalent-dollar gains/losses it would confer/impose
on them (to the extent that their doing so increases the probability that
any government choice in question will be made/rejected or any nongovernment choice in question will be allowed/prohibited). And in part,
it reflects the prohibitive cost and difficulty of estimating the gains and
losses that individual winners and losers experience through any method
that does not rely on their testimony. The impracticability of this
approach to assessing a choice’s economic efficiency has led economists
to base their economic-efficiency assessments on Welfare Economics
propositions that relate the impact of a choice on economic efficiency to
its impact on the number and magnitude of the Pareto imperfections in
the economy—i.e., of the various types of “imperfections” whose
individual exemplars could cause economic inefficiency in an otherwise
Pareto-perfect economy (see discussion below). Although this general
approach is almost certainly best, the particular Welfare Economics
proposition on which economists have relied, and overwhelmingly
continue to rely, is wrong.
The vast majority of economists base their approach to economicefficiency assessment on the assumption that the fact that the economy
will contain no economic inefficiency if it contains no Pareto
imperfections (no imperfections in seller competition, no imperfections
in buyer competition, no externalities, no taxes on the margin of income,
no relevant imperfections in the information available to a resource
allocator [resource-allocator sovereignty], no failures to maximize by
principal resource allocators [given the information that is available to
them] and no [critical] buyer surplus) has two critical implications: (1)
any choice that reduces the number or magnitude of the Pareto
imperfections in an economy will tend to reduce the amount of
2. The text refers to equivalent-dollar gains and losses rather than to dollar gains and losses
because many of the relevant effects not only are not direct monetary effects but, in some instances,
also cannot be capitalized by the person that experiences them. Take, for example, the equivalentdollar gain that the owner of swampland who values it positively (for sentimental reasons) despite
the fact that its market value is zero obtains from an environmental policy that cleans up the water
in the swamp and/or the air over the swamp. If the policy does not improve the property sufficiently
for it to have a positive market value post-policy, this winner will not be able to capitalize his
equivalent-dollar gain.
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economic inefficiency in that economy even if it does not eliminate all
Pareto imperfections in the economy and (2) any choice that increases
the number or magnitude of the Pareto imperfections in an economy will
tend to increase the amount of economic inefficiency in that economy. In
making this assumption, these scholars ignore one or both of the
following: (1) the related facts that (A) the Pareto imperfection that the
policymaker is in a position to reduce or eliminate (that the economicefficiency analyst is assuming could be reduced or eliminated) is not the
only Pareto imperfection in the economy and (B) the economy would be
Pareto-imperfect even if the Pareto imperfection in question were
eliminated and/or (2) the central lesson of The General Theory of
Second Best—viz., since in general any Pareto imperfection one can
eliminate will be as likely to counteract as to exacerbate the net joint
effect of the Pareto imperfections that remain, there is no general reason
to believe that the fact that a choice will reduce the number or magnitude
of the Pareto imperfections in an economy will even tend on that account
to increase economic efficiency if it will not eliminate all Pareto
imperfections in the economy. 3 In Part II, this Article will describe The
General Theory of Second Best and its central point. In Part III, I will set
forth a twenty-nine step protocol for estimating the economic efficiency
of any given choice. In Part IV, I will discuss the economic efficiency of

3. For a detailed critique of a wide variety of canonical economics and Law & Economics
articles and bodies of literature that execute analyses of the economic efficiency of the policies on
which they focus on the assumption that The General Theory of Second Best can be ignored—i.e.,
on the implicit assumption either that the Pareto imperfection that the policy in question targets is
the only (relevant) Pareto imperfection in the economy and/or that the other relevant Pareto
imperfections the relevant economy contains perfectly counteract each other’s relevant effects—see
RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE DEFINITION, PREDICTION, AND
RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 271-338 (Yale University Press, 2008). For a critique of the
various arguments that economists who acknowledge the existence of The General Theory of
Second Best allege justify their and the profession’s ignoring it, see id. at 338-42. I should add that
the General Theory of Second Best also applies when the maximand is something other than
economic efficiency. For example, if one makes the contestable assumption that the point of a legal
trial is to discover the truth of the matter and also makes the contestable assumption that truth would
be discovered if the trier-of-fact were ideal and all possibly-relevant evidence were introduced at
trial, a second-best argument might lead to the conclusion that, when actual triers-of-fact (say,
juries) are imperfect, outcomes would be improved if certain categories of evidence were deemed
inadmissible. Or, if the distributive optimum were that all relevant creatures have the same,
meaningful opportunity to do X or the same amount of resources (measured by their allocative value
in their alternative uses) and one could in each case develop a set of sufficient conditions for the
achievement of either of these possible distributive optima, in a world in which one or more
members of the (different) sets of optimal conditions for the achievement of either optimum will not
be fulfilled, one might be able to make a second-best argument for failing to fulfill one or more of
the other members of the different sets of sufficient conditions for achieving one of the optima in
question.
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egalitarian wealth-redistribution policies in a way that reflects The
General Theory of Second Best and conclude that such redistributions
would be far more economically efficient than economists tend to
assume—indeed, in my judgment, would probably be economically
efficient, all things considered. Part V contains a brief conclusion.
II. A NON-ECONOMIC AND ECONOMIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE CENTRAL
POINT OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST
This Part uses a non-economic example and then an economic
example to illustrate The General Theory of Second Best’s central,
negative conclusion that, once one or more members of a set of
sufficient conditions for the attainment of an optimum will not be
fulfilled, choices that increase the extent to which the other members of
that set of sufficient conditions for the attainment of that optimum are
fulfilled cannot be assumed to even tend to bring one closer to the
optimum. Here is the non-economic example. Assume that there is an
ideal way to drive a car around a corner (I will not specify the associated
maximand or objective function [whatever it is that would ideally be
maximized])—viz., to drive the car 15 miles per hour and turn the
steering wheel in the appropriate direction 40 degrees per second. If the
car is being driven 15 miles per hour, the optimal rate at which to turn
the steering wheel will be 40 degrees per second because, if one turns
the steering wheel 40 degrees per second in the appropriate direction,
both (all) of the optimal conditions will be fulfilled, and the optimum
will be achieved. However, what if the accelerator is jammed, the car is
moving 85 miles per hour, and nothing can be done about those facts?
Will it be (second-best) optimal to turn the steering wheel 40 degrees per
second in the appropriate direction? Almost certainly not. Although it
might turn out that fulfilling the second optimal condition (turning the
steering wheel 40 degrees per second in the appropriate direction) is
second-best optimal, any such reality will be fortuitous in the sense that
it will not follow from the fact that turning the steering wheel 40 degrees
per second in the appropriate direction is an optimal condition (belongs
to a set of sufficient conditions for the achievement of the relevant
optimum). To determine the best way to turn the steering wheel when
the car is traveling 85 miles per hour, one would have to examine how
departures from the two optimal conditions interact to cause suboptimal
outcomes both in general and in the particular relevant context. For
example, the presence of a steel-reinforced concrete wall 50 yards from
the road may play an important role in the relevant analysis even if it
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would play no role in determining the optimal way to drive the car
around the corner in question.
The pertinent points of this example are: (1) once one of two
optimal conditions is not fulfilled, there is no general reason to believe
that fulfilling or more closely approximating the second optimal
condition will even tend to improve the outcome and (2) in order to
determine whether to fulfill or more closely approximate the second of
two optimal conditions when the first is not fulfilled (or, more generally,
what to do about a second of two outcome-determinants when the
magnitude of the first outcome-determinant is not first-best), one must
combine an appropriate theoretical analysis with context-specific
empirical findings.
Even at this juncture, it may be helpful to be more specific about
the negative corollaries of The General Theory of Second Best. The
General Theory of Second Best has the following seven economicefficiency-related negative corollaries:
1. the fact that “no imperfections in seller competition” is one of the
set of Pareto-optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient
conditions for the maximization of economic efficiency—does not
justify the conclusion that any choice that reduces the number or
magnitude of the imperfections in seller competition in an economy
that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-choice will tend to increase
economic efficiency on that account;
2. the fact that “no imperfections in buyer competition” is one of the
set of Pareto-optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient
conditions for the maximization of economic efficiency—does not
justify the conclusion that any choice that reduces the number or
magnitude of the imperfections in buyer competition in an economy
that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-choice will tend to increase
economic efficiency on that account;
3. the fact that “no (real) externalities” is one of the set of Paretooptimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for
the maximization of economic efficiency—does not justify the
conclusion that a choice that reduces the number or magnitude of
externalities in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect postchoice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account;
4. the fact that “no taxes on the margin of income” (i.e., no taxes that
increase [directly or indirectly] with income) is one of a set of Paretooptimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for
the maximization of economic efficiency—does not justify the
conclusion that a choice that reduces the number or magnitude of taxes
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on the margin of income in an economy that will still be Paretoimperfect post-choice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that
account;
5. the fact that “all resource allocators are sovereign” (i.e., know
everything they need to know to identify the choices that would best
satisfy their preferences) is one of the set of Pareto-optimal
conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for the
maximization of economic efficiency—does not justify the conclusion
that choices that will improve the relevant information that resource
allocators have in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect postchoice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account;
6. the fact that “each resource allocator would always make the
resource-allocating choices that would maximize the extent to which
his or her preferences are satisfied if each had all relevant information
[that each resource allocator always maximizes])” is one of the set of
Pareto-optimal conditions—which constitutes a set of sufficient
conditions for the maximization of economic efficiency—does not
justify the conclusion that choices that reduce the extent to which
resource allocators fail to maximize (given the information that is
available to them) in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect
post-choice will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account;
and
7. the fact that “no resource-allocating choice yields a critical amount
of buyer surplus (an amount that critically affects the choice that is
made)” is one of the set of Pareto-optimal conditions—which
constitutes a set of sufficient conditions for the maximization of
economic inefficiency—does not justify the conclusion that choices
that reduce the frequency or the extent to which buyer surplus is
critical in an economy that will still be Pareto-imperfect post-choice
will tend to increase economic efficiency on that account.

The economic example focuses on the conventional claim (which is
alleged to supply an economic-efficiency rationale for pro-competition
policies) that any imperfection that decreases the price competition a
seller faces will cause the seller to increase economic inefficiency by
choosing not to produce one or more units of the relevant product
despite the fact that the production of these units would be economically
efficient (and, relatedly, that any policy that increases the price
competition a seller faces will cause the seller to decrease economic
inefficiency by inducing the seller to increase its unit output of the good
in question). Although the economists who make this claim do not
specify even the category of use from which the resources used by the
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seller that faces imperfect price competition withdraws the resources it
uses to produce units of its product, I will assume (as I think they are
assuming implicitly) that the resources in question were or would be
withdrawn from alternative unit-output-increasing uses (from the
production of units of other products). Those who claim that any
imperfections in price competition an individual seller faces will cause it
to produce too few units of its product from the perspective of economic
efficiency assume perfectly plausibly that any seller that faces
imperfections in price competition (1) will face a downward-sloping
demand curve—i.e., will be operating in a situation in which the
successive units it could produce of its product will have progressivelylower dollar values to the successive, usually-different buyers who place
the highest dollar-value on the successive units in question—and (2) will
not find it profitable to engage in price discrimination—indeed, will find
that the most-profitable or least-unprofitable way to price any quantity of
its product will be to set the single per-unit price for that product that
will result in the relevant quantities being purchased and charge that perunit price for all units of its product. Ad arguendo, I will accept both of
these assumptions (though each will be inaccurate in some cases).
Proponents of these claims then point out that (on the above two
assumptions) the additional (marginal) revenue that a seller that faces
imperfections in price competition would obtain by selling the first (say
[n + 1]th) unit of its product it finds just unprofitable to sell (the first
extra-marginal unit of its product) will be lower than the price for which
it could sell that unit since in order to sell the (n + 1)th unit at the
highest price for which it could be sold, the seller would have to take a
lower price on the n units of its product it could have sold for a higher
price. Proponents of these claims then (1) assert that the highest price for
which any unit of any product could be sold equals the allocative value
of that unit (the net dollar gain to all affected parties generated by its
being consumed by its buyer as opposed to its being destroyed in some
allocatively-costless way) and (2) point out that (on the two additional
assumptions previously delineated) the preceding assertion implies that
the private benefits that any producer that faces an imperfection in price
competition would obtain by producing the first unit of its product it
finds unprofitable to produce will be lower than the allocative benefits
that the consumption of that unit (once it was produced) would generate.
Although the assumption delineated after (1) in the preceding
sentence will not always be correct in an otherwise-Pareto-imperfect
economy (in which consumption can generate externalities, buyers can
misjudge the dollar value of a good to them, buyers can misestimate the
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dollar cost to them of buying a good, buyers may be non-discriminating
monopsonists, buyers may fail to maximize [given the information they
possess], and taxes may be levied on the sale of products), ad arguendo I
will ignore this Second-Best-Theory-relevant reality in the text that
follows. On the plausible assumption that any seller’s production of the
first extra-marginal unit of its product would cause the seller to incur an
infinitesimally-small loss and the dubious 4 (implicit) assumption that the
private additional (marginal) cost the seller would have to incur to
produce the first unit of its product it would find unprofitable to sell
would equal the allocative cost of its production of that unit (the
allocative value that the resources that the production of that unit would
“use up” would generate in their alternative employments), the
proponents of these claims then point out that the preceding conclusion
implies that the decision of any seller that faces an imperfection in price
competition not to produce the first unit of its product it finds (just)
unprofitable to produce is economically inefficient. Proponents point out
that, if the relevant marginal private cost equals the relevant marginal
allocative cost, the fact that any imperfection in price competition would
reduce the private benefits to the producer of producing its first extramarginal unit of output below the allocative benefits that the
consumption of that unit of output would generate would imply that the
choice to produce that first extra-marginal unit of output would be not
only less profitable than economically efficient but also economically
inefficient (would sacrifice allocative benefits that would exceed the
allocative cost it would save) despite the fact that it would be
infinitesimally profitable (would impose private costs on the producer
[the marginal revenue it would cause the prospective producer to
sacrifice] that are just below the private benefits it would confer on the
producer [the marginal costs it would obviate the producer’s incurring]).
Proponents of these claims then point out that (on its implicit
assumptions) the preceding argument establishes not only that producers
that face imperfect price competition will generate economic
inefficiency by not producing one or more additional units of their
respective products but also, and relatedly, that any policies that would
eliminate the imperfection in price competition the relevant sellers faced
(without generating any allocative transaction costs or preventing any
seller from producing its output efficiently—e.g., from taking advantage
of economies of scale) would increase economic efficiency by

4. For an explanation of why this assumption is dubious, see the text of this section, starting
in the next paragraph.
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eliminating the divergence between the marginal revenue (private
benefits) the seller could obtain by producing the first extra-marginal
unit of its product and the price for which it could sell that unit (the
unit’s allocative value) by putting the seller in a position in which it
could sell the additional unit in question without reducing the price it
charged for the other units of the product it sold (by confronting the
seller with a horizontal rather than a downward-sloping demand curve).
Second-Best Theory implies that, in a world that contains more
Pareto imperfections than a single imperfection in price competition that
could be eliminated, the preceding argument would no longer justify the
conclusions its proponents claim it warrants—the conclusions that any
seller that faces imperfect price competition will produce an
economically-inefficiently-low output of its product and the related
conclusion that any policy that eliminates an imperfection in seller price
competition will increase economic efficiency by causing the seller that
originally faced the eliminated imperfection to increase its output to the
economically-efficient quantity. Second-Best Theory undermines this
argument because it makes clear that, in an economy that contains other
imperfections than the individual imperfection in seller price
competition that can be eliminated, one cannot assume that the marginal
private cost a seller has to incur to produce successive units of its
product equals the marginal allocative cost of its doing so.
I will investigate two hypotheticals that illustrate this point. The
first assumes that the eliminatable imperfection in seller price
competition was not the only imperfection in seller price competition in
the relevant economy. If the seller that faced the eliminatable
imperfection in price competition would withdraw the resources it would
use to produce its first extra-marginal unit of output from the production
of units of other goods by non-discriminating producers that also face
imperfections in price competition that result in their facing downwardsloping demand curves, these other imperfections in price competition
would reduce the marginal cost of the first seller’s output below its
marginal allocative cost (the allocative value that the resources used to
produce the relevant unit of output would generate in their alternative
uses) by reducing the marginal revenue these latter sellers would obtain
by producing and selling the sacrificed units of output below the
allocative value of those units of output (the price for which they could
have been sold, on otherwise-Pareto-perfect assumptions). This would,
in turn, reduce the private value to these latter sellers of the resources
they would have used to produce the sacrificed units of output (a
function of the marginal revenue the sellers could have obtained by
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selling those sacrificed units of output) below the allocative value those
resources would have generated in the latter sellers’ employ (a function
of the higher-than-marginal-revenue price[s] for which the sacrificed
unit[s] of output could have been sold), thereby reducing the private cost
of those resources to the first seller (infinitesimally higher than their
private value to their alternative user) below the allocative cost of the
first seller’s using those resources (the allocative value the resources
would have generated in their alternative user’s employ).
But if the marginal cost of the first unit of output that a seller that
faces imperfect price competition finds just unprofitable to produce is
lower than its allocative cost, the fact that the private benefits that that
seller would have obtained by selling that first additional unit once it
was produced would be lower than the allocative benefits that would
have been generated by that unit’s consumption once it was produced
will not guarantee—indeed, will not even create a higher-than-50%
probability—that the first seller’s production of the first extra-marginal
unit of its product would have been economically efficient: when
marginal cost is lower than marginal allocative cost, the fact that
marginal revenue is lower than marginal allocative value does not make
it more likely than not that the profits that would have been generated by
the production of an extra-marginal unit (marginal revenue minus
marginal cost) will be lower than the allocative-efficiency gain that
would have been generated by the production of that unit (marginal
allocative value minus marginal allocative cost). If the good produced by
the seller that faces an eliminatable imperfection in seller price
competition is product X and the goods from whose production resources
are withdrawn to produce product X are goods Y1. . .YN, X will be
underproduced relative to Y1. . .YN from the perspective of economic
efficiency in an economy in which the only Pareto imperfections are
imperfections in seller price competition if and only if PX/MCX exceeds
the weighted-average PY/MCY ratio for goods Y1. . .YN where the weights
assigned to products Y1. . .YN are proportional to the allocative value of
the sacrificed units of Y1. . .YN respectively. Therefore, in an otherwisePareto-perfect economy in which two or more producers face imperfect
price competition, one cannot justify the related conclusions that (1)
sellers that face imperfections in seller price competition will produce
economically-inefficiently-low outputs and (2) policies that eliminate
the imperfection in price competition a seller faces will increase
economic efficiency by citing the fact that no imperfections in seller
price competition is a Pareto-optimal condition.
The same conclusions will be justified when the economy contains

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss2/9

10

Markovits: The General Theory of Second Best and Economic-Efficiency

2016]

THE GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST AND ECONOMIC-EFFICIENCY

447

any other type of Pareto imperfection. Assume, for example, that the
producer of X that faced an imperfection in seller price competition used
a production process to produce X that generated external costs. Since
the non-internalization of these external costs will cause the marginal
private cost of X to its producer to be lower than the marginal allocative
cost of X, the same argument I used to justify the conclusion that, in the
absence of further information, one cannot assume that the elimination
of an imperfection in seller price competition will increase economic
efficiency by inducing the seller in question to increase its unit output
when the economy in question contains other imperfections in seller
price competition also justifies the conclusion that, in the absence of
further information, one cannot assume that the elimination of even the
only imperfection in seller price competition in an economy will
increase economic efficiency in the above way if the economy also
contains an external cost of production.
This Part has focused on the negative implications of The General
Theory of Second Best. I hasten to point out one should not exaggerate
the significance of these negative implications. The General Theory of
Second Best does not imply either that it will never be economically
efficient to eliminate or reduce a Pareto imperfection or that it will never
be possible or economically efficient for an economic-efficiency analyst
to predict that a choice that would reduce or eliminate (or, for that matter
increase) a Pareto imperfection would increase economic efficiency on
that account. However, The General Theory of Second Best does imply
that, to justify any such conclusion, an analyst must make a sound
argument that is theoretically sophisticated about the different ways in
which the various Pareto imperfections in the system (which could
individually cause economic inefficiency in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect
economy) interact to cause different categories of economic inefficiency
and incorporates the results of ex ante economically-efficient research
into the magnitudes of the parameters whose salience the theory
establishes.
III. THE ECONOMICALLY-EFFICIENT PROTOCOL FOR PREDICTING OR
POSTDICTING THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF A CHOICE
Three general categories of approaches to economic-efficiency
analysis can be distinguished:
1. first-best-allocative-efficiency analysis—the category of analysis
that most economists use—proceeds on the assumption that the Pareto
imperfection that the choice under review targets or is assumed to be
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affecting is the only (relevant) Pareto imperfection in the economy;
2. second-best-allocative-efficiency analysis executes perfect
theoretical analyses of the causes of all the categories of economic
inefficiency whose magnitudes the choice under review did or would
affect and the diverse ways in which those causes interact to cause
each such category of resource misallocation, collects perfectly
accurate data on the pre-choice and post-choice magnitudes of the
parameters that determine the amount of each category of resource
misallocation the economy in question contains or contained prechoice and contained or would contain post-choice, and analyzes
perfectly the implications of the preceding research for the impact that
the choice had/would have on each category of economic inefficiency
whose magnitudes it did/would affect; and
3. third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis takes account not only of
the possible allocative benefits that all relevant theoretical-research and
empirical-research projects would generate but also of the allocative
cost of each such project (the allocative cost of the resources that
relevant research-projects would consume, any allocative cost they
would generate by delaying a related government decision, and any
allocative cost the project would generate by requiring the government
to make intrinsically-economically-inefficient choices to finance its
execution) and executes only those projects that are deemed to be ex
ante allocatively efficient.

I use the acronym FBLE to reference “first-best-allocative-efficiency” or
“first-best allocatively efficient” (an acronym whose use is favored by its
resemblance to the word “fable” since FBLE analyses are based on the
fable that the target Pareto imperfection is the only [relevant] Pareto
imperfection in the system) 5; I use the acronym SBLE to reference
“second-best-allocative-efficiency” or “second-best allocatively
efficient” (an acronym whose use is favored by its resemblance to the
word “sable” since SBLE analyses would be not only beautiful but
prohibitively expensive [if they could be executed]); and I use the
acronym TBLE to reference “third-best-allocative-efficiency” or “thirdbest allocatively efficient” (an acronym whose use is favored by its
resemblance to the word “table” since TBLE analysis is the type of
analysis that should be brought to the policy-evaluation table).
This Part of the Article will briefly, and therefore crudely, outline
the protocol for an economic-efficiency analysis that I think is TBLE. I

5. My daughter, Stefanie, has suggested that the acronym FBLE is also appropriate because
first-best-allocative-efficiency analyses are “feeble.”
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will start by defining eleven concepts or sets of concepts that this
protocol references.
The first relevant concept is the concept of a category of “resourceuse.” I distinguish the following five basic categories of resource-uses:
(1) unit-output-increasing resource-uses, in which resources are used to
increase the output of an existing product (the symbol UO is used to
refer both to “unit-output-increasing uses” and to “unit output”); (2)
quality-or-variety-increasing-investment-creating
resource-uses,
in
which resources are devoted to creating a superior or additional productvariant, a superior or additional distributive outlet, or additional
inventory or capacity (which increase the average speed with which the
owner of the created inventory or capacity can supply buyers throughout
a fluctuating-demand cycle) (the symbol QV will be used to refer both to
“quality-or-variety-increasing” and to “QV-investment-creating uses”);
(3) production-process-research-executing resource-uses, in which
resources are devoted to discovering alternative production processes
whose use would reduce the average total private and/or allocative cost
of producing a relevant quantity of an existing product (the symbol PPR
is used to refer both to “production-process research” and to “PPRexecuting uses”); (4) uses of resources that result from the choice among
known production processes that could be employed to produce a
relevant quantity of an existing product, including non-innovative, costreducing, investment-creating resource-uses (using known technology to
construct new plants, to modernize old plants, or to select and train a
workforce to reduce average costs of production); and (5) consumption
resource-uses (in which final goods are consumed by final consumers).
The second relevant concept is the concept of a (somewhat)
arbitrarily-defined portion of product-space, which I reference with the
acronym ARDEPPS. I substitute this concept for the conventional
concept of a “market” because I believe that there is no non-arbitrary
way to define either classical economic markets (which are supposed to
be defined to maximize the fulfillment of certain ideal-type assumptions
about [1] the competitiveness of products placed within a market and [2]
the difference between the competitiveness of any pair of products
placed in a given market and the competitiveness of any product in that
market with any product not in that market) or antitrust markets (which
are supposed to be defined to maximize the contribution that data on
market-aggregated parameters can make to the legally-correct resolution
of antitrust cases). 6
6.
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The third relevant concept is the concept of a category of “actual
allocation of resources.” In my (standard) terminology, the expression
“resource allocation” refers to the withdrawal of resources from one or
more categories of use in one or more specified ARDEPPSes and their
devotion to a specified use in a specified ARDEPPS. Thus, an actual
resource allocation might involve the creation of a new product-variant
(in my terminology, the creation of a QV investment) with some
resources withdrawn from UO-increasing uses, some resources
withdrawn from alternative QV-investment-creating uses, and some
resources withdrawn from PPR-executing uses.
The fourth relevant concept is the concept of a resource-allocation
component. Although I acknowledge that most actual resource
allocations involve the withdrawal of resources from two or more
categories of resource-uses and their devotion to one category of
resource-use, for expositional and computational reasons, the distortionanalysis protocol distinguishes and focuses on the following 6 categories
of one-category-of-resource-use to one-category-of-resource-use actualresource-allocation components: (1) UO-to-UO allocations, (2) QV-toQV allocations, (3) PPR-to-PPR allocations, (4) UO-to-QV or QV-toUO allocations, (5) PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR allocations, and (6) UOto-PPR or PPR-to-UO allocations.
The fifth relevant concept is the concept of a category of resource
misallocation. I distinguish 10 basic categories of resource misallocation
(economic inefficiency).
1. misallocations of resources between or among alternative unitoutput-increasing uses between the production of alternative final
products or inputs (inter-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO misallocations between
the production of final products or inputs [when the products or inputs
in question are distant competitors] and intra-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO
misallocations between the production of final products or inputs
[when the products or inputs in question are close competitors] and [as
I have already indicated] the term “ARDEPPS” is an acronym for a
[somewhat] arbitrarily-defined portion of product-space);
2. misallocations of resources between or among alternative QVinvestment-creating uses (inter-ARDEPPS and intra-ARDEPPS QVto-QV misallocations);
S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U.
ANTITRUST LAW: VOLUME I BASIC CONCEPTS AND ECONOMICS-BASED LEGAL ANALYSES OF
OLIGOPOLISTIC AND PREDATORY CONDUCT 165-81 (Springer, 2014) and Richard S. Markovits, On
the Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 572-74, 581, 586,
600-01 (2002).
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3. misallocations of resources between or among alternative PPRexecuting uses (inter-ARDEPPS and intra-ARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR
misallocations);
4. misallocations of resources between unit-output-increasing and QVinvestment-creating uses (UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocations);
5. misallocations of resources between PPR-executing and QVinvestment-creating uses (PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR misallocations);
6. misallocations of resources between PPR-executing and UOincreasing uses (PPR-to-UO or UO-to-PPR misallocations);
7. misallocations of resources between known, alternative production
processes
(non-research-related
“production
optimum”
misallocations);
8. misallocations of resources that result when a buyer purchases an
input or final good from a supplier that is not allocatively-best-placed
to supply the buyer—i.e., from a supplier that generated higher
marginal or incremental allocative costs to supply the buyer than an
alternative supplier of the same input or final good would have had to
generate to do so;
9. misallocations of final goods among their potential final consumers
that do not derive from any associated poverty and income/wealth
inequality (conventional “consumption optimum” misallocations); and
10. misallocations of final goods among their potential final consumers
that is generated by the poverty and/or income/wealth inequality that
results from the actual allocation of final goods among their potential
final consumers (non-conventional “consumption optimum”
misallocation).

The sixth set of relevant concepts contains three categories of
avoidable costs that choices can affect. The impact of a choice on these
allocative costs is relevant to its economic efficiency—indeed, affects its
allocative efficiency dollar for dollar: (1) the (non-public-financerelated) allocative transaction costs generated in the relevant economy
by both its government and its non-government actors, (2) the risk (and
uncertainty) costs that relevant actors incur and the allocative costs that
actors generate to reduce the risk costs they bear, and (3) the publicfinance-related, economic-efficiency losses the government generates
when financing its operations.
The seventh relevant concept is the concept of “the economicsmarginal resource allocation in a specified category in a specified
ARDEPPS”—the least-profitable but not-unprofitable resource
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allocation in that category in that ARDEPPS.
The eighth relevant concept is the concept of a “mathematicsmarginal resource allocation”—a resource allocation that is
infinitesimally small. Economics-marginal resource allocations may or
may not be mathematics-marginal.
The ninth relevant concept is the concept of “the distortion in any
private-benefit, private-cost, or profit figure”—the difference between
the private figure in question and its allocative counterpart (respectively,
the allocative benefit, allocative cost, or economic efficiency of a
specified resource-allocating choice).
The tenth relevant concept is the concept of the aggregate
percentage-distortion in the profits yielded by a specified economicsmarginal resource allocation in a specified ARDEPPS—(the profits
yielded by that allocation minus the impact of that allocation on
economic efficiency) divided by the allocative cost of that allocation.
The eleventh and final concept I want to explain at this juncture is
the resource-allocation marginal-allocative-product curve for a specified
resource-allocation component in a specified ARDEPPS. This curve
appears in a diagram whose vertical axis measures dollars (in practice,
measures in dollars the allocative product and allocative cost of the
successive resource allocations in the specified category in the specified
ARDEPPS) and whose horizontal axis measures the total allocative cost
of resources devoted to the specified resource allocation in the specified
ARDEPPS. The curve indicates the allocative value that would be
generated by successive uses of resource measured by their allocative
cost when devoted to the category of use specified in the ARDEPPS
specified after having been withdrawn from the specified categories of
use in specified ARDEPPSes.
The protocol that I think will prove to be the third-best-allocativelyefficient approach to predicting or postdicting the impact of any choice
on economic efficiency has three distinguishing features. First, it uses
different approaches to analyze the impacts of a choice respectively on
(1) inter-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO, inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV, interARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO, QV-to-PPR or PPRto-QV, and UO-to-PPR or PPR-to-UO misallocation; (2) intraARDEPPS UO-to-UO, intra-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV, intra-ARDEPPS
PPR-to-PPR misallocation, the misallocation that results when
homogeneous final goods or inputs are supplied by higher-allocativecost rather than lower-allocative-cost suppliers, the misallocation that
results when for other reasons producers choose to use a known, higherallocative-cost rather than a known, lower-allocative-cost production
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process, consumption-optimum misallocation that is not generated by
the income/wealth inequality in the economy in question, and
consumption-optimum misallocation that is generated by income/wealth
inequality; and (3) the choice’s impacts on the allocative transaction
costs generated in the economy in question, the risk and uncertainty
costs that individual members of the relevant society bear and the
allocative costs they generate to reduce the risk and uncertainty costs
they bear, and the amount of economic inefficiency the government
generates when financing its operations.
Second, the approach that I think will prove to be TBLE to take to
predicting or postdicting the impact of a choice on the six categories of
economic inefficiency listed after (1) in the preceding sentence focuses
on the choice’s predicted impacts on the aggregate percentagedistortions in the profits yielded by the economics-marginal exemplars
of the categories of resource allocation associated with each of these
categories of economic inefficiency in a TBLE-large, random sample of
the economy’s ARDEPPSes and on the attributes of the studied
ARDEPPSes’ relevant resource-allocation, marginal-allocative-product
curves between the pre-choice and post-choice total-allocative-cost
quantities for the categories of resource allocation in question in the
studied ARDEPPSes. The protocol I am recommending focuses on the
impacts of choices on the distortions in the profit-figures for these
economics-marginal resource allocations because, as we saw in the first
section of this Article, (1) negative distortions in such profit-figures will
usually imply that, from the perspective of economic efficiency, too few
resources have been devoted to the relevant category of resource
allocation in the ARDEPPSes in question (that one or more resource
allocations in the relevant category were not made in the ARDEPPSes in
question because they would have been unprofitable despite the fact that
they would have been economically efficient) and (2) positive
distortions in such profit-figures will usually imply that, from the
perspective of economic efficiency, too many resources have been
devoted to the relevant category of resource allocation in the
ARDEPPSes in question (that some resource allocations in the relevant
category were made in the ARDEPPSes in question because they were
profitable despite the fact that they were economically inefficient).
Third, the approach that I think will prove to be TBLE to take to
analyzing the economic efficiency of a choice takes account of the fact
that theoretical work and empirical work are usually non-perfect and
always allocatively costly by instructing the economic-efficiency analyst
to proceed by (1) generating initial assessments of the economic

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 9

454

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:437

efficiency of the choice under review from a less-than-perfect research
base, then (2) analyzing the ex ante allocative efficiency of doing
additional research on specific issues and doing the research deemed to
be ex ante economically efficient, (3) continuing this process until no
additional research is concluded to be ex ante economically efficient,
and (4) announcing the conclusion that the research done warrants in a
paper that describes in detail the protocol that was followed and the
intermediate conclusions that were generated. I recognize that this
account does not address the infinite-regress problem that attaches to any
such maximizing analysis: a problem posed by the question whether an
analyst who is trying to maximize the economic efficiency of his or her
efforts should make an economically-efficient attempt to consider
whether he or she should think about whether to think about whether to
think about whether to think about whether to think about . . . the
economic efficiency of doing addition research of a specific kind on a
specific issue.
The protocol for the economic-efficiency analysis I think would be
TBLE contains the following 29 steps (take heart—that is still 30 steps
fewer than the movie):
1. define inter-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO, inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV,
inter-ARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO, PPR-to-QV or
QV-to-PPR, and UO-to-PPR or PPR-to-UO resource misallocation;
2. analyze the way in which a relevant exemplar of each type of Pareto
imperfection would tend to cause each of the six categories of
economic inefficiency defined in Step (1) in an otherwise-Paretoperfect economy by distorting the profits generated by the economicsmarginal resource allocations with which each of these categories of
resource misallocation is associated and/or by causing a relevant
resource allocator to make a privately-unprofitable resource-allocating
choice of the relevant kind;
3. divide up the economy’s product-space into the set of ARDEPPSes
that are economically efficient to distinguish and choose a random,
third-best-economically-efficiently-large sample of those ARDEPPSes
on which to focus the analysis of the impact of the choice on the
categories of economic inefficiency defined in Step (1);
4. analyze the different ways in which all exemplars of all types of
Pareto imperfections interact to distort the profitability of the
economics-marginal resource allocations associated respectively with
each of the six Step-(1)-defined categories of economic inefficiency—
inter alia, create mathematical formulas that indicate the different
ways in which the various Pareto imperfections interact to generate
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distortions in the profits yielded by the economics-marginal exemplars
in any defined ARDEPPS of the various categories of resource
allocation with which each of these six categories of resource
misallocation is associated;
5. assuming that the relevant resource-allocating decisions maximize
the profits of the relevant resource-allocating principals, analyze the
relationship between (A) the amount of misallocation in any of the six
categories defined in Step (1) that a given ARDEPPS contains and
(B)(i) the aggregate distortion in the profits yielded by the economicsmarginal exemplars of the associated category of resource allocations
and (ii) the attributes of the relevant ARDEPPS’ resource-allocation
marginal-allocative-product curve (MLP. . ./. . .) between the quantity of
resources measured by their allocative cost that would be allocatively
efficient to devote to the relevant category of resource allocation in the
relevant ARDEPPS and the quantity of resources actually devoted to
that category of resource allocation in the ARDEPPS in question;
6. analyze the relationship between the errors that resource allocators
in any ARDEPPS commit by choosing to effectuate unprofitable extramarginal resource allocations in any Step-(1)-defined category and by
choosing not to effectuate profitable economics-marginal and
economics-intra-marginal resource allocations in any Step-(1)-defined
category and the amount of resource misallocation in the relevant
category the ARDEPPS in question contains, given the aggregate
distortion in the profits that would have been yielded by its economicsmarginal resource allocation in the relevant category and the attributes
of its MLP. . ./. . . curve over the relevant range of relevant-resourceallocation quantities;
7. combine (A) existing data on and parameter-guesstimates of the
number and/or magnitude of the Pareto imperfections in the relevant
economy pre-choice that affect the aggregate distortions in the profits
yielded by the economics-marginal resource allocations in the Step(1)-defined categories in the ARDEPPSes to be studied and (B) the
mathematical formulas developed in Step (4) to generate
estimates/guesstimates of the pre-choice aggregate distortions in the
profits yielded by the economics-marginal resource allocations in the
six categories defined in Step (1) in the ARDEPPSes studied;
8. estimate or guesstimate (A) the impacts of the choice on the
magnitudes of the Pareto imperfections and other factors that
determine the aggregate distortion in the profits yielded by the
economics-marginal resource allocations in the Step-(1)-defined
categories in the ARDEPPSes to be studied and derivatively (B) the
impact of the choice on the aggregate distortions in the profits yielded
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by (the usually-changing) economics-marginal resource allocations in
each Step-(1)-defined category in each ARDEPPS to be studied;
9. estimate or guesstimate the attributes of the pre-choice MLP. . ./. . .
curves for each Step-(1)-defined category of resource allocation in
each ARDEPPS to be studied over the range of total allocative cost
figures associated with the pre-choice and post-choice aggregateprofit-distortion estimates;
10. on the assumption (that will be relaxed below) that the choice
under consideration will not alter the attributes of any relevant
MLP. . ./. . . curve over any relevant range by increasing the
organizational allocative efficiency (proficiency) of the firms that
execute the UO-increasing, QV-creating, or PPR-executing resourceuses whose allocative products such curves indicate, derive an estimate
or guesstimate of the impact of the choice on the amounts of each
Step-(1)-defined category of resource misallocation that the studied
ARDEPPSes contain from Step (7)’s estimates or guesstimates of the
pre-choice magnitudes of the aggregate distortions in the profits
yielded by the economics-marginal resource allocation in each Step(1)-defined category in each studied ARDEPPS, Step (8)’s estimates or
guesstimates of the impact of the choice on those aggregate-profitdistortion figures, and Step (9)’s estimates or guesstimates of the
attributes of the pre-choice MLP. . ./. . . curves over the relevant ranges;
11. devote a TBLE amount of resources to considering the possibility
that the choice whose economic efficiency is at issue may have altered
the attributes of one or more relevant MLP. . ./. . . curves in some way
other than by increasing the organizational allocative proficiency of the
firms that execute the relevant resource-uses (e.g., by changing the
distribution of income/wealth in the relevant society) and, if (contrary
to my suspicions) it proves to be TBLE to consider this possibility to
any significant extent, estimate or guesstimate the impacts that the
choice has on relevant segments of relevant MLP. . ./. . . curves and the
impacts the choice has on the amount of Step-(1)-listed categories of
resource misallocation the studied ARDEPPSes contain on this
account—i.e., generate new estimates of the choice’s impact on the
amounts of each Step-(1)-defined category of resource misallocation
the studied ARDEPPSes contain that take account of the choice’s
impacts on the studied ARDEPPSes’ relevant MLP. . ./. . . curves;
12. estimate or guesstimate the total amount of resources measured by
their allocative cost that the economy devoted to each Step-(1)-defined
category of resource allocation pre-choice;
13. estimate or guesstimate the total amount of resources measured by
their allocative cost the studied ARDEPPSes devoted to each Step-(1)-
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defined category of resource allocation pre-choice;
14. on the assumption that the choice would not affect either the
organizational allocative proficiency of any relevant resource-user or
the totals calculated in Steps (12) and (13), estimate or guesstimate the
impact of the choice on the total amount of each Step-(1)-defined
category of resource misallocation the relevant economy contains by
multiplying the studied-ARDEPPS estimates/guesstimates of Step (11)
by the ratio of the relevant economy-wide total-allocative-cost figure
estimated in Step (12) to the studied-ARDEPPS total-allocative-cost
figure estimated in Step (13);
15. estimate or guesstimate the impact that the choice would have on
the total amount of Step-(1)-defined categories of resource
misallocation that the economy would contain if the choice would not
affect the organizational allocative efficiency of any relevant resourceuser or the total allocative cost of the resource allocations associated
with any Step-(1)-defined category of resource misallocation either in
any studied ARDEPPS or in the economy as a whole by summing the
six separate estimates or guesstimates generated in Step (14);
16. devote a TBLE amount of resources to investigating the possible
impact of the choice on the total allocative cost of the resources
devoted to each category of resource allocation associated with a Step(1)-defined category of resource misallocation both in the studied
ARDEPPSes and in the economy as a whole and, if the conclusion is
reached that the choice would or did affect the quantities in question,
revise the estimates/guesstimates of Step (14) and (15) to take these
impacts into account—i.e., generate new estimates or guesstimates of
the choice’s impact on the total amount of Step-(1)-defined
misallocation the economy contains that take the Step-(16)-referenced
possibility into account;
17. define intra-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO misallocation, intra-ARDEPPS
QV-to-QV misallocation, intra-ARDEPPS PPR-to-PPR misallocation,
the misallocation generated when buyers of homogeneous inputs or
final products purchase them from suppliers that are not allocativelybest-placed to supply them with the inputs or final products in
question, the misallocation generated when (for other reasons) moreallocatively-costly, known production processes are used rather than
less-allocatively-costly,
known
production
processes,
and
consumption-optimum misallocation that is not generated by any
poverty or income/wealth inequality associated with the allocation of
final goods among their potential final consumers;
18. analyze the Pareto imperfections or categories of conduct that
would cause each of the Step-(17)-listed categories of resource
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misallocation in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy if no choice
could deter a producer from employing or enable a producer to employ
a privately-cheaper, known production process that was also
allocatively cheaper, could deter a potential QV investor from creating
or enable a potential QV investor to create a more-profitable QV
investment, or could deter a potential production-process researcher
from executing or enable a potential production-process researcher to
7
execute a more-profitable and more-allocatively efficient PPR project;
19. (A) in what I contestably take to be the vast majority of cases—
viz., cases in which only one of the potential causes of any of the
categories of resource misallocation listed in Step (17) is operative to a
significant extent, predict or postdict the impact of the choice under
review on the amount of that type of misallocation the relevant
economy contains, assuming that it does not have any of the deterring
or enabling effects referenced in Steps (17) and (18), by using existing
data to estimate or by guesstimating the pre-choice incidence of the
operative cause of the category of misallocation in question, devoting
an ex-ante-allocatively-efficient amount of resources to estimating the
impact of the choice under review on the incidence of that cause, and
devoting an ex-ante-allocatively-efficient amount of resources to
estimating the impact that the choice-generated change in the incidence
of the relevant cause would have on the amount of the relevant
category of resource misallocation the economy in question would
contain if it were otherwise-Pareto-perfect; and (B) in those cases in
which two or more of the possible causes of one of the Step-(17)-listed
categories of resource misallocation are present to a significant degree,
predict or postdict the impact of the choice under review on the
amount of resource misallocation the relevant economy contains by
executing an analysis (that I will not fully outline here) that takes
account of the way in which the different types of Pareto imperfections
that would cause each of these categories of resource misallocation in
an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy that are present to a significant
degree in the relevant economy interact to generate the relevant

7. For example, (1) explain how even on the above assumptions in an otherwise-Paretoperfect economy intra-ARDEPPS UO-to-UO misallocation and the misallocation generated by the
supply of homogeneous inputs or final products by allocatively-higher-cost suppliers would be
generated by predatory pricing, retaliatory pricing, external-cost-of-production differences, or
relevant buyer errors, (2) explain why fair-rate-of-return public-utility-pricing regulation will tend
to cause the regulated firm to use a known, higher-private-cost and presumptively-higher-allocativecost production process that is more-capital-intensive rather than a known, less-capital-intensive
production process that is less-privately-and-presumptively-less-allocatively expensive, and (3)
explain how in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy consumption-optimum misallocation that is
not generated by poverty or income/wealth inequality would be caused by price discrimination,
inter-consumer differences in consumption externalities, and relevant consumer errors.
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category of resource misallocation by distorting the profitability of the
relevant resource-allocating choices and by leading the relevant
resource allocators to make unprofitable resource-allocating choices
and estimating or guesstimating both the pre-choice incidence of the
causes of each of these categories of resource misallocation and the
impacts of the choice under review on the incidence of the causes of
each such category of resource misallocation;
20. estimate or guesstimate the impact that a choice (say, a business
choice to execute or not to execute a merger, acquisition, or joint
venture or to grow internally or a government choice to prohibit/tax or
allow/subsidize a class of private-business choices to execute mergers,
acquisitions, joint ventures or to grow internally) has on the
organizational allocative efficiency (proficiency) of one or more firms
by permitting or precluding them from combining assets that are
complementary for scale or non-scale reasons and/or by enabling two
or more firms to reduce the extent to which their QV investments
and/or PPR projects are more duplicative than is jointly profitable and
economically efficient: (A) when the choice in question would reduce
the private costs that a relevant firm or firms would have to incur to
produce its/their pre-choice outputs and/or additional units of a
particular good it or they are already producing, estimate or
guesstimate (i) the frequency with which the choice would have this
effect, (ii) the private-cost savings the choice would enable the firm or
firms in question to obtain on its/their pre-choice outputs, (iii) the ratio
of the associated allocative-cost savings to the private-cost savings in
8
question, (iv) the quantity of additional output the choice would
induce the firm or firms in question to produce and the economic
9
efficiency of its/their producing the extra units in question; (B) when
8. This ratio will depend on the percentages of the saved resources that would otherwise
have been withdrawn from UO-increasing, QV-creating, and PPR-executing uses and the ratio of
the allocative value that the saved resources would have generated in those alternative uses to the
private benefits they would have generated for their alternative employers.
9. The impact that the production of the extra units in question will have on economic
efficiency will depend on its impact on the pre-choice and post-choice difference between the ratios
of each relevant product’s P*/MC* ratio and the weighted-average counterpart ratio(s) for the
products Z1. . .ZN whose sales would be reduced by the output-expansion for the product in question
where (1) the asterisks attached to the Ps indicate that the P* figures have been adjusted to make
each P* figure equal the marginal allocative value (MLV) of the good in question (i.e., to take
account of the fact that P may not equal MLV in a Pareto-imperfect economy), (2) the asterisks
attached to the MCs indicate that each MC figure has been adjusted to produce MC* figures whose
ratio indicates the marginal rate at which the relevant economy can transform the sacrificed bundle
of Z1. . .ZN products into the marginal unit of X (an adjustment required by the fact that the
associated MC ratio will equal the relevant marginal rate of transformation only fortuitously in a
Pareto-imperfect economy), and (3) the weighted –average P*/MC* ratio for Z1. . .ZN is created by
giving weights to the P*/MC* ratios for the individual products in product-set Z1. . .ZN that are
proportionate to the allocative values of the sacrificed quantities of the respective products in
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the choice in question would increase the allocative efficiency of the
QV investments that a relevant firm or firms could create by increasing
the intrinsic efficiency of its or their individual QV investments,
estimate or guesstimate (i) the frequency with which the choice would
induce the firm or firms in question to substitute one or more
intrinsically-more-profitable QV investments for the same quantity of
intrinsically-less-profitable individual QV investments, (ii) the Paretoimperfections-generated distortion in the profits yielded by any such
QV-investment substitution(s), (iii) the frequency with which the
choice would induce the firm(s) whose organizational economic
efficiency it increased or one of its/their rivals to make a QV
investment when no QV investment would otherwise have been made
by increasing the intrinsic profitability of the additional QV investment
the figure in question could make and thereby either leading the firm in
question to make an additional QV investment or inducing a rival to
make a QV investment by creating a situation in which the firm would
invest if the rival did not, (iv) the profits yielded by any such induced
QV investment and the distortion in those profits (the economic
efficiency of any additional QV investments the choice induced to be
10
made), (v) the frequency with which the choice would deter the firm
or firms in question or one of its/their rivals from making a QV
investment by creating a situation in which the firm or firms and the
rival realize that if one of them makes a QV investment the other will
find it profitable to respond by making a QV investment as well, and
(vi) the amount by which the QV investment that was deterred would
11
have increased or decreased economic efficiency; (C) when the
choice in question would enable two or more firms that were separate
at least pre-choice to reduce the extent to which their QV investments
were jointly-unprofitably-duplicative and (presumptively) economicinefficiently-duplicative, estimate or guesstimate (i) the profits the
choice would enable the firms in question to realize by substituting
less-duplicative for more-duplicative QV investments (controlling for
the quantity of resources they devote to QV investment), (ii) the
Pareto-imperfection-generated distortion in those profits, (iii) whether
and the extent to which, by increasing their ability to make lessduplicative QV investments, the choice makes it profitable for the
firms in question to make additional QV investments, (iv) the profits

product-set Z1. . .ZN.
10. The sum of the impacts of those investments on inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV
misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR
misallocation.
11. The sum of the impacts of the elimination of the QV investment in question on interARDEPPS QV-to-QV misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or
QV-to-PPR misallocation.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss2/9

24

Markovits: The General Theory of Second Best and Economic-Efficiency

2016]

THE GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST AND ECONOMIC-EFFICIENCY

461

the firms in question realize on any additional QV investments the
choice induces them to make and the Pareto-imperfection-generated
distortion in those profits (the economic efficiency of any induced
12
additional QV investments ), (v) whether and the extent to which, by
increasing their ability to make less-duplicative QV investments, the
choice makes it profitable for the firms in question to reduce the
amount of QV investments they make in the relevant area of productspace, and (vi) the profits the firms in question realize by reducing the
amount of QV investments they make in the relevant area of productspace and the Pareto-imperfection-generated distortion in those profits
13
(the effect of the QV-investment reduction on economic efficiency);
(D) when the choice in question would increase the allocative
efficiency of the PPR that a relevant firm or firms could execute by
increasing the intrinsic allocative efficiency of the individual PPR
projects it/they execute, estimate or guesstimate the parameters, sets of
parameters, and economic-efficiency effects that are counterparts to
the six listed after “20(B)” for the counterpart QV-investment-related
possibility, and (E) when the choice in question would increase the
allocative efficiency of the set of PPR projects one or more firms
execute with a given amount of resources measured by their allocative
cost by reducing the extent to which the PPR projects it or they execute
are jointly-unprofitably-duplicative and presumptively economicinefficiently-duplicative and when the choice in question either
induces one or more firms to execute additional PPR projects or deters
it or them from allocating as many resources to PPR as it or they
would otherwise have done, estimate or guesstimate the parameters,
sets of parameters, and economic-efficiency effects that are
counterparts to those listed after “20(C)” for the QV-investmentrelated counterpart analysis;
21. estimate or guesstimate the impact of the choice under review on
the amount of consumption-optimum misallocation the relevant
economy contains because of the poverty and income/wealth
inequality associated with its allocation of final goods among their
potential final consumers by estimating or guesstimating (A) the
poverty and income/wealth inequality present in the relevant economy
pre-choice, (B) the impact of the choice on the extent of poverty and
income/wealth inequality on the society in question, and (C) the extent
to which the choice-generated changes in poverty and income/wealth
12. The sum of the impacts of the induced QV investments on inter-ARDEPPS QV-to-QV
misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or QV-to-PPR
misallocation.
13. The sum of the impacts that the eliminated QV investment originally had on interARDEPPS QV-to-QV misallocation, UO-to-QV or QV-to-UO misallocation, and PPR-to-QV or
QV-to-PPR misallocation.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 9

462

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:437

inequality will affect the magnitudes of the seven categories of
poverty-and/or-income/wealth-inequality-generated misallocation that
will be identified in the final paragraph of Part IV of this Article (the
paragraph that immediately precedes its Conclusion);
22. estimate or guesstimate the economic-efficiency effect of the
impact that the choice under review will have by generating fiscal
effects that cause the government to make decisions that alter
economic efficiency: (A) estimate or guesstimate the fiscal impact of
the choice under review (its impact on the tax revenues the relevant
government collects, the profits the relevant government makes by
selling goods and services conventionally produced by nongovernment actors, the fees it collects for providing what are
conventionally government-services [e.g., court fees], the private
transaction costs it incurs to devise and pass legislative and
administrative regulations and to implement such laws and regulations
through the Executive Branch [through administrative agencies, police,
prosecutorial offices, prison systems, and parole-related institutions],
and the private transaction costs the government incurs to operate its
courts); and (B) estimate or guesstimate the economic efficiency of the
decisions that the choice under review causes the relevant government
to make by altering its fiscal position—(i) if the analyst concludes that
the choice under review will worsen the government’s fiscal position,
(a) estimate or guesstimate the extents to which the government will
respond to this reality by raising tax-rates or imposing new taxes, by
raising the prices it charges for goods and services, by printing money
or selling bonds to “finance” the relevant deficit, or by eliminating
other expenditures and (b) analyze the economic-efficiency effects of
these government responses, and (ii) if the analyst concludes that the
choice under review will improve the government’s fiscal position, (a)
estimate or guesstimate the extents to which the government will
respond to this reality by lowering tax-rates or eliminating some taxes,
lowering the prices it charges for goods and services, destroying some
of the money it possesses or retiring some government debt, or making
other expenditures and (b) analyzing the economic efficiency of each
of these responses;
23. estimate or guesstimate the impact that the choice will have on the
allocative transaction costs generated in the economy that were not
counted as an allocative cost in the previously-executed economicefficiency predictions or postdictions: (A) the additional allocative
transaction costs that a government choice to devise and pass a policy
caused or would cause the government to generate itself and the
additional allocative transaction costs that a government choice to
implement a policy (say, enforce a law or process a transfer-claim)
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caused or would cause the government to generate, the perpetrators to
generate (to defend themselves if they were being prosecuted or
subjected to an administrative hearing or to conceal their illegal
activity or to pursue a transfer-claim), victims to generate to obtain
redress or compensation, and those who think they are or may be
eligible for government transfers to generate to apply for those
transfers or (B) the allocative-transaction-cost reductions that a
government choice to pass or implement a law or regulation would
generate by deterring potential violators from engaging in allocativetransaction-costly conduct and by obviating the potential victims of the
deterred conduct making allocative-transaction-costly moves to reduce
their vulnerability to such conduct.
24. estimate or guesstimate the impact that the choice under review
had or would have on the risk and uncertainty costs that relevant
individuals bear (which are allocative as well as private costs) and on
the allocative cost of the risk-and-uncertainty-cost-reduction moves
that individuals and organizations make;
25. add together the estimates and/or guesstimates of the impacts of the
choice under review on the amounts of all categories of resource
misallocation, on the amount of misallocation the government’s related
fiscal decisions generate, on those of the allocative transaction costs
generated in the economy that were not previously counted, on the risk
and uncertainty costs borne by relevant individuals, and on the
allocative cost of the risk-and-uncertainty-cost-avoidance moves made
by relevant individuals and organizations to generate an initial estimate
of the economic efficiency of the choice under review;
26. assess the ex ante economic efficiency of doing further theoretical
research and additional empirical research into the magnitudes of the
parameters whose relevance to the economic efficiency of the choice
under review theory has established: estimate (A) the allocative cost of
withdrawing from their alternative uses the resources that would be
devoted to the additional research projects that could be executed, any
allocative cost any additional research would generate by delaying the
relevant choice/decision, and any net allocative costs the government
would generate to finance the research expenditures in question; (B)
the allocative benefits that each possible research-project would
generate—(i) the probability that the information that each possible
additional research project would provide would critically affect the
analyst’s assessment of the economic efficiency of the choice under
review times the allocative-efficiency gain that that information would
generate if it would critically affect the analyst’s conclusion about
whether the choice under review was/would be economically efficient
(on the naïve assumption that the decision whether to make any
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relevant choice would be completely determined by the choice’s
predicted economic efficiency, the economic-efficiency gain that
would be generated by substituting the choice the additional research
would cause to be made for the choice that would otherwise have been
made [minus the allocative cost of revising the choice that would
otherwise have been made]) plus (ii) the allocative benefits the relevant
research-project would yield by increasing the accuracy of the
estimates or guesstimates of the economic efficiency of other choices,
and relatedly (C) the difference between the allocative-benefit and
allocative-cost estimates in question (i.e., the ex ante allocative
efficiency of each possible additional research project);
27. execute the additional research projects estimated to be ex ante
economically efficient;
28. repeat Steps (26) and (27) until no additional research project is
found to be ex ante economically efficient; and
29. generate a final estimate of the economic efficiency of the choice
under review from the results of all the theoretical and empirical
research that was available or was executed for the purpose of
assessing the economic efficiency of the choice under review and
guesstimates of the magnitudes of those parameters that have not been
investigated sufficiently to be estimated and publish the relevant
economic-efficiency conclusion together with a detailed account of the
analyses that generated it.

I anticipate that even those who are willing to admit that (what
should I say?) my protocol is thorough (exhaustive and exhausting?) and
perhaps even clever will dismiss it as impracticable. I have three
responses. First, it is essential to recognize that I am not proposing that
economic-efficiency analysts execute all the steps in this protocol
perfectly or even as well as they could if one ignored the allocative cost
of any such efforts; I am proposing that economic-efficiency analysts
execute the protocol to a third-best-allocatively-efficient extent. Indeed,
the previous sentence is somewhat miswritten in that my account of the
protocol’s various relevant steps includes instructions that they be
executed to a TBLE extent. Second, a self-serving assertion: I am
confident that, in virtually all situations, some more-or-less-refined
variant of this protocol will be third-best allocatively efficient—that the
use of some variant of the protocol will increase economic efficiency if
public choices are based to any insignificant degree on the economicefficiency conclusions it generates. Third, there is no justifiable
alternative to this protocol (or to a version of this protocol that has been
improved by further work). No-one has developed an alternative
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protocol for predicting or postdicting the economic efficiency of a
choice that responds defensibly to The General Theory of Second Best,
and, I submit, no defensible alternative can be developed. Only one
defensible course of action is available to economists and others who
reject this protocol: admit that nothing reliable can be said about the
economic efficiency of choices and recommend that choices be
evaluated exclusively on such other grounds as their impact or
distributive and/or corrective justice and/or the moral defensibility of the
decision-procedure through which they were made.
IV. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF TAXING THOSE WHO ARE BETTEROFF THAN THE AVERAGE MEMBER OF THE RELEVANT SOCIETY TO
FINANCE REDISTRIBUTIONS THAT REDUCE POVERTY AND/OR
INCOME/WEALTH INEQUALITY
Almost regardless of the distributive norm to which they
individually subscribe, most economists claim that a trade-off must be
made between equality and economic efficiency. 14 I think that this
conclusion is certainly contestable and probably wrong. Because I
suspect that this issue is of more interest to the probable readers of this
Symposium than are the fairly-technical analyses of Second-Best Theory
and its implications that the rest of this Article has executed, I have
decided to close this Article by analyzing the allegation that a trade-off
must be made between equality and economic efficiency despite the fact
that Second-Best Theory plays a relatively-small role in the relevant
analysis.
The traditional argument for the equality/economic-efficiency
trade-off is first-best:
1. in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy, the taxes on the margin of
earned income that would be levied to finance any transfers to the poor
would misallocate resources by reducing the private benefit from
supplying market labor (the net wage) below the allocative benefits the
relevant labor would supply (which, on otherwise-Pareto-perfect
assumptions, would equal the gross [before-tax] wage that workers
would be paid), thereby causing potential suppliers of market labor to
allocate from the perspective of economic efficiency too much time to
the supply of do-it-yourself labor and the “production” of leisure and
not enough time to the supply of market labor;
2. in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy, the taxes on the margin of
14. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (The
Brookings Institution, 1975).
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unearned income that would be levied to finance any transfers to the
poor would misallocate resources by reducing the private benefits from
saving and investing (the net private returns to investment) below the
allocative benefits that investment generates (on otherwise-Paretoperfect assumptions, the gross [before tax] returns to investment),
thereby causing potential investors to misallocate resources both by
saving and investing less than would be economically efficient and by
supplying less market labor than would be economically efficient (to
the extent that part of the private benefits from supplying such labor
consists of the returns a worker can earn by saving and investing his or
her wages); and
3. in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy, those transfers to the poor
or to individuals with lower-than-societal-weighted-average income
and wealth that increase when their income and wealth decrease or that
increase with their illnesses and disabilities will tend to cause
economic inefficiency by deterring their potential recipients from
supplying economically-efficient market labor and from making
economically-efficient decisions to save and invest and by inducing
their potential recipients to make economically-inefficient general
consumption, life-style, labor, and medical-care-consumption choices
that increase the extent to which they suffer illnesses and disabilities
that result in their receiving government transfers.

All these arguments can be criticized for ignoring the relevance of
the other Pareto imperfections that our economy contains. However,
with minor exceptions, I think that even in our actual, highly-Paretoimperfect economy the redistributive policies whose economic
efficiency these first-best arguments call into question do cause the
categories of economic inefficiency such arguments are incorrectly used
to “demonstrate” their cause.
The reason why the standard economic claim that equality must be
traded off against economic efficiency is at a minimum contestable and,
I believe, wrong is not that the argument for that claim is first-best
(ignores The General Theory of Second Best) but that it ignores the fact
that poverty and/or income/wealth inequality generates economic
inefficiency in at least seven ways. More specifically, the standard claim
that equality must be traded off against efficiency is wrong because it
ignores the fact that redistributions that reduce poverty and
income/wealth inequality will increase economic efficiency by reducing
the amount of economic inefficiency generated in the relevant economy
because the poverty/wealth-income-inequality it contains (1) increases
the amount of misallocation the economy generates because
economically-efficient investments in the human capital of children and
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adults are not made; (2) increases the amount of misallocation that
consumption choices generate because it is advantageous for individuals
when they are poor to make external-cost-generating consumption
choices (e.g., to buy cheap, external-cost-generating cars and rent cheap,
external-cost-generating housing units) whose consumption by them is
economically inefficient); (3) increases the amount of misallocation
generated because the relevant economy’s members make privatelydisadvantageous consumption choices that are economically
inefficient—i.e., because (A) by damaging them neurologically (by
affecting their mothers’ nutrition, physical health, and psychological
state when they are in utero) and by reducing their preparedness for
schooling and the quality of the education they receive both inside and
outside schools, the poverty of the poor increases both the frequency
with which the individuals who are poor fail to understand the attributes
of products and their full cost to them and the frequency with which they
do their math wrong or make consumption choices unthinkingly and (B)
by increasing their frustration and unhappiness, the poverty of
individuals who are poor leads them to discount future benefits too
highly from the perspective of their own lifetime welfare; (4) increases
the amount of misallocation that poverty causes by inducing individuals
who are poor to make economically-inefficient decisions to perform
dangerous, lawful labor in all the ways that it causes poor individuals to
make economically-inefficient consumption-decisions that are not in
their interest and, in a society in which poor individuals who have been
injured at work or their families receive various types of government
transfers for which their non-poor counterparts would not be eligible, by
rendering economically-inefficient decisions to perform dangerous
lawful labor profitable for those who make them or for their families; (5)
increases the amount of misallocation that the people who are poor or
have significantly less income and wealth than does the average
participant in the relevant economy generate by engaging in
economically-inefficient criminal activities, by making them less
concerned about the impact of their criminal choices on their victims (by
alienating them), by reducing the difference between the attractiveness
of life in prison and life without successful crime outside prison, by
causing them to use too high a discount rate to calculate the present
value of their future welfare, and by causing them to be too optimistic
about the profitability of crime for reasons other than the discount rate
they apply to their future welfare; (6) reduces the political influence of
the individuals who are poor or have lower-than-average income/wealth
below the political influence of individuals who are not poor or who

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 9

468

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:437

have higher-than-average income/wealth and thereby increases the
amount of economic inefficiency the government of the relevant society
generates because its choices are based on a calculation that places a
lower weight on the average dollar gained or lost by the individuals who
are absolutely or relatively poor than on the average dollar gained or lost
by the individuals who are not absolutely or relatively poor; and
hopefully (7) increases the economic inefficiency the economy generates
because its distribution of income and wealth dis-serves (on balance) the
“external preferences” of the members of and participants in the society
in question (their non-parochial preferences for the resources and
opportunities that others have).
V. CONCLUSION
The General Theory of Second Best demonstrates that, in a
situation in which one or more members of a set of sufficient conditions
for the achievement of an optimum cannot or will not be fulfilled, there
is no general reason to believe that choices that increase the extent to
which the other members of the relevant set of sufficient conditions are
fulfilled will even tend on that account to yield an improvement. In
economics and Law & Economics, the optimum that is usually in play is
maximizing economic efficiency, the relevant set of sufficient conditions
for the maximization of economic efficiency is the set of Pareto-optimal
conditions, and the basic negative corollary of The General Theory of
Second Best is that the conventional economic-efficiency argument for
increasing seller competition, decreasing monopsony, reducing
externalities, lowering taxes on the margin of income, improving the
product-attribute, product-performance, and full-product-purchasingcost information available to buyers, and increasing the extent to which
resource allocators make the decisions that would best satisfy their
preferences if they were perfectly informed cannot bear scrutiny because
it assumes incorrectly, in contravention of The General Theory of
Second Best, that the fact that no imperfection in seller competition, no
monopsony, no externalities, no taxes on the margin of income,
resource-allocator sovereignty, and resource-allocator maximization are
Pareto-optimal conditions implies that, even in our inevitably-Paretoimperfect economy, choices that increase the extent to which each or all
of these conditions is/are fulfilled will on that account increase economic
efficiency.
This Article delineates, explains, and illustrates The General
Theory of Second Best, explains and outlines the protocol for economic-
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efficiency prediction and postdiction that I think responds economically
efficiently to The General Theory of Second Best, and explains why,
notwithstanding the consensus among economists to the contrary,
tax/redistribution policies that reduce poverty and inequality are likely to
increase economic efficiency.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

33

